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T
his book is about the interaction between mathe-
matics and physics in the work and thought of Albert
Einstein, with emphasis on his later years. In his early
work, culminating in his annus mirabilis 1905, Einstein’s
use of mathematics was elementary; indeed, the picture of
space-time as a four-dimensional manifold that has become
standard was introduced in 1907 by the mathematician
Hermann Minkowski, rather than by Einstein himself
(though based on the special theory of relativity formulated
by the latter in 1905 in terms of clocks, rods, and light
signals). This changed in 1912, when Einstein’s friend and
(ETH Zu¨rich) colleague Marcel Grossmann introduced him
to Riemannian geometry and the closely associated tensor
calculus of Gregorio Ricci-Curbastro and his pupil Tullio
Levi-Civita. This turned out to be a decisive event in the
history of science, as Einstein’s subsequent application of
this area of mathematics to the physics of gravity climaxed
in his General Theory of Relativity of November 1915,
surely a high point in human thought comparable with
(and to some extent superseding) Isaac Newton’s Principia
of 1687.
But here the controversy starts. First, there seems to be a
significant discrepancy between Einstein’s later recollection
of his creation of General Relativity – for example, in his
autobiographical notes (Einstein, 1949) – and the careful
and detailed recent reconstruction of this process by his-
torians of science based at the Max Planck Institute for the
History of Science at Berlin (Renn, et al., 2007). In Ein-
stein’s own view (Einstein, 1949), mathematical intuition
and deduction had played the essential creative role:
I have learned something else from the theory of gravi-
tation: no ever so inclusive collection of empirical facts
can ever lead to the setting up of such complicated
equations [i.e., Einstein’s field equations Rlm  12 glmR ¼
jTlm: A theory can be tested by experience, but there is
no way from experience to the setting up of a theory.
Equations of such complexity as the equations of the
gravitational field can be found only through the dis-
covery of a logically simple mathematical condition …
On the other hand, a study of his notebooks and other
sources displays a constant interplay between physical and
mathematical arguments, where only at the very end Einstein
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indeed used the mathematical requirement of general
covariance (i.e., the condition of invariance under general
coordinate transformations) to clinch the issue. And even so,
this requirement was (mistakenly) felt by Einstein to be a
reflection of two physical ideas that had guided him toward
his theory of gravity right from the beginning, namely the
equivalence principle (between free fall in a homogeneous
gravitational field and inertial motion in the absence of
gravity) and the idea of general relativity of motion
(cf. Norton, 1993).
So it seems that Einstein’s memory was colored by the
course his post-1915 work had taken: sidestepping the
quantum theory, which initially he had pioneered himself
(but whose probabilistic character he famously rejected
from 1926 onward), he put most of his effort into
attempts to create a unified field theory of classical gravity
and electromagnetism, hoping to recover quantum phe-
nomena (such as elementary particles) in the guise of
singularity-free solutions of the classical field equations he
sought.
Jeroen van Dongen’s remarkable book – an updated and
revised version of his Ph.D. Thesis of 2002, meanwhile
matured through the author’s research in theBerlin group just
mentioned and subsequently at the Einstein Papers Project
based at CalTech – offers a delightful tour through Einstein’s
efforts in that direction, constantly analyzed from the dialec-
tics of Einstein’s use of (pure) mathematics versus actual
physics. The author thereby establishes – and this may be said
to be the main point of the book – a gradual shift from the
latter (which formed the strength of Einstein’s youth) to the
former (which, some would say, marked his decline; see
below).
Following the opening chapter reviewing Einstein’s road
to general relativity, as a second starter toward the main
course we find a chapter on Einstein’s method of theoret-
ical physics. Helpfully, Einstein occasionally commented
on his own methodology, as well as on the relationship
between mathematics and physics in general: for example,
his famous aphorism ‘‘As far as the laws of mathematics
refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are
certain, they do not refer to reality’’ is actually part of a very
insightful essay (Einstein, 1921), in which he analyzes the
said relationship in the light of the ‘‘modernist’’ tendency
(initiated by David Hilbert) to strip mathematics of its tra-
ditional meaning in the physical world (cf. Gray, 2008).
Elsewhere – notably in a letter to his friend Maurice Solo-
vine from 1952, originally unearthed by Gerald Holton –
Einstein explained how the uncertain application of
mathematics to reality ought to proceed: from experiments
E we infer mathematical axioms A for some physical theory,
which (by a purely ‘‘logical’’ deductive path) implies certain
assertions S about E. The inference from E to A is neither
‘‘logical’’ nor ‘‘inductive’’ – Einstein’s criticism of induction
predated Karl Popper’s, and likewise for the falsification
criterion – but is only ‘‘intuitive’’ or ‘‘psychological.’’ But, as
Einstein’s own practice (or, more precisely, his own rec-
ollection thereof) shows, it is precisely at this stage that
arguments related to mathematical simplicity, symmetry,
beauty, etc., play a decisive role. The relationship between
S and E is not ‘‘logical’’ either, because E is itself not of a
logical nature. On the other hand, it is ‘‘far less uncertain
than the relation of A to E.’’
The irony, then, is that in his later years Einstein
increasingly failed to pay attention to the experiences E;
apart from bypassing quantum mechanics, his unified field
theories never took the strong and the weak nuclear forces
into account. More generally, as van Dongen points out,
the mathematically oriented top-down style of Einstein’s
later years sharply contrasted with the general trend of
theoretical physics at the time, which was bottom-up,
phenomenological, and relied on as little mathematics as
possible – as a case in point, throughout his career Niels
Bohr only used high-school level mathematics. To make
things worse, even within the style he had chosen for
himself, Einstein was outclassed by the mathematician
Hermann Weyl, whose attempts to unify gravity and elec-
tromagnetism – though as unsuccessful as Einstein’s per se –
led him to the unprecedented ‘‘gauge principle’’ that forms
the basis of modern quantum field theory and elementary
particle physics.
More generally, though rightly recognized as one of the
supreme geniuses humanity has produced, Einstein –
unlike Newton within the same category – simply lacked
the mathematical talent and creativity that would have been
necessary to bring his program forward. This is particularly
clear in an episode discussed in detail by van Dongen,
namely Einstein’s adventures with semivectors in the early
1930s. During his work on general relativity Einstein had
become used to vectors and tensors, but the spinors
introduced by Paul Dirac in 1928 (subsequently analyzed
by mathematicians such as Weyl, Bartel Leendert van der
Waerden, and E´lie Cartan) were new and alien to him. Thus
Einstein looked for analogous objects that did behave like
vectors, coming up with the notion of a semivector. In the
style of Dirac, he guessed a field equation for semivectors,
which Einstein initially interpreted as a sensational pre-
diction of two elementary particles, identified with the
electron and the proton! Unfortunately, a straightforward
group-theoretical analysis carried out by Valentin Barg-
mann (at the time a doctoral student at Zu¨rich of Wolfgang
Pauli’s, one of Einstein’s sharpest critics) showed that
semivectors were just direct sums of Dirac spinors, so that
Einstein’s prediction had simply (though implicitly) been
put in by hand. Einstein’s subsequent work on Kaluza–
Klein theory (a five-dimensional generalization of general
relativity intending to unify gravity and electromagnetism,
dating back to 1919) in the late 1930s and early 1940s was
less ridiculous, but despite persistent effort and the pres-
ence of excellent collaborators such as Bargmann (who
had moved to Princeton) and Peter Bergmann, it led to
absolutely nothing, neither in physics nor in mathematics.
This sounds like a sad story, though van Dongen livens
it with entertaining side information (e.g., on Einstein’s
collaborators), and also provides a psychological explana-
tion, in that ‘‘an emotionally defining moment [i.e., the
discovery of general relativity] was instrumental in locking
him, eventually, in a belief in his idealized method and the
pursuit of unified field theories…, validated by a one-sided
recollection of the experience of [general] relativity.’’ But
where does this leave us in our perception of Einstein?
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His scientific biographer Abraham Pais left no room for
doubt in a TV-documentary on Einstein (Kroehling, 1991):
In fact, in his first part of his life when he did his really
important work, his notion of simplicity were [sic] the
guide to the 20th century insofar as science is con-
cerned. Later on I think he was just completely off base.
I mean if Einstein had stopped doing physics in the year
1925 and had gone fishing, he would be just as beloved,
just as great. It would not have made a damn bit of
difference.
In addition, Pais all but ridicules Einstein’s well-known
criticism of quantum mechanics in his biographies of both
Einstein (Pais, 1982) and Bohr (Pais, 1991), portraying the
latter as the clear victor in the Bohr–Einstein debate on the
foundations and validity of quantum theory. Similarly, van
Dongen – without taking sides himself – quotes J. Robert
Oppenheimer as saying that in his last 25 years Einstein
had been ‘‘completely cuckoo,’’ his work ‘‘a failure,’’ and
his attempt at unification a ‘‘hopelessly limited and histor-
ically rather accidentally conditioned approach.’’
However, over the past few decades a gradual reap-
praisal of the later Einstein has emerged. As to the main
topic of his own book, van Dongen quotes string-theorist
and popular science writer Brian Greene as saying that
‘‘Einstein was simply ahead of his time’’ with his unification
program; indeed, Edward Witten – who has led the string
theory program for the last 25 years – is sometimes por-
trayed as Einstein’s successor. Similarly, literature on the
foundations of quantum theory that has not been written
by those under the personal spell of Bohr typically
acknowledges the depth of Einstein’s critique – even as late
as 1935! – and shows its profound influence on the current
debate (cf. Landsman, 2006, and references therein). Even
Einstein’s attempt to find particle-like solutions of classical
field theories has been revived from the 1970s onward,
notably in theories of solitons, magnetic monopoles, in-
stantons, skyrmions, and the like (Rajaraman, 1982).
What remains is the fact that these days practically no
one shares Einstein’s rejection of quantum theory: the vast
difference between his and current attempts at unification
(such as string theory) is that the latter incorporate quan-
tum (field) theory. What van Dongen has now shown is
that this rejection was by no means a consequence of
senility, but of a post-1915 research style that became
increasingly dissonant with Einstein’s contemporaries,
such as Bohr. Let me add that if Einstein had absorbed
as much as the Preface of Dirac’s renowned book on
quantum mechanics (Dirac, 1930), he would have
been hooked:
The formulation of these laws [of nature] requires the
use of the mathematics of transformations. The impor-
tant things in the world appear as the invariants … of
these transformations. … The growth of the use of
transformation theory, as applied first to relativity and
later to quantum theory, is the essence of the new
method in theoretical physics. Further progress lies in
making our equations invariant under wider and still
wider transformations.
Dirac here refers to the invariance of quantum theory under
unitary transformations, clearly suggesting the analogy with
the invariance of Einstein’s theory of general relativity
under general coordinate transformations – which invari-
ance had been so dear to its creator! Indeed, although (in a
different context) van Dongen mentions (and documents)
the fact that Einstein ‘‘knew’’ Dirac’s book, he rightly adds
the crucial qualifying remark that Einstein ‘‘never seems to
have internalized its perspective.’’ Pity him!
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